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Covert Wars and Presidential Power:
Judicial Complicity in a Realignment of
Constitutional Power
Introduction
Presidents, particularly in recent years, have frequently conducted
hostile actions against foreign governments without first seeking congres-
sional approval. In some cases, such as has occurred in Grenada, the
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and elsewhere, American troops have
been used directly against foreign nations.' In other situations, such as
with the Nicaraguan Contras, the overthrow of Chile's Allende govern-
ment, and the unsuccessful Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion, the President
has used "covert" actions to commit the United States to hostilities
against a foreign sovereign.2
The Constitution allocates the power to declare war to the legisla-
tive branch of government.3 The executive branch, however, often uses
hostile force against foreign sovereigns without congressional action, or
with minimal congressional participation.4 By declining to decide cases
which challenge presidential authority to use hostile force against a sov-
ereign nation, the judiciary has aided presidential excesses in the use of
force.
Many cases concerning the Vietnam War, for example, were not de-
1. Use of American troops abroad is not uncommon. For an account of the United
States invasion of Grenada, see NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 52-58. Other uses of American
troops abroad are discussed at length in A. THOMAS, THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 13-30 (1982).
2. The Nicaraguan Contras are United States supported guerrillas fighting the Nicara-
guan government. One of the earliest published reports concerning the Contras can be found
in NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42. An early 1987 discussion of Contra activities can be
found in N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The Central Intelligence Agency's involve-
ment in the violent overthrow of the Chilean government is discussed in TIME, Sept. 30, 1974,
at 16. Similarly, United States involvement in an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government
is discussed in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 18, 1963, at 82.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 11.
4. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
5. The judiciary has used procedural mechanisms of judicial abstention to avoid deci-
sions on the merits. The primary procedural mechanism courts use to avoid constitutional
issues is the political question doctrine, but other procedural devices are also used. See infra
notes 122-185 and accompanying text.
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cided on the merits but dismissed on procedural grounds.6 Since then,
courts have refused to address such issues as the President's ability to
terminate a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China,7 the
President's military support of government forces in the civil war in El
Salvador,8 and the President's military and financial support of an-
tigovernment guerilla forces in Nicaragua.9
This realignment of war powers raises several questions. First, as-
suming courts are willing to resolve these controversies, are these presi-
dential actions legitimate under the Constitution? Second, should the
judiciary decide on the merits cases challenging presidential authority to
engage in the use of force against a sovereign nation?
This Note examines the constitutional allocation of war and war-
related foreign policy powers, and judicial complicity in increasing the
concentration of those powers in the executive branch. Part I discusses
two contemporary cases dealing with the President's foreign and military
policy decisions in Central America. Part II provides an overview of
constitutional law in the area of foreign affairs powers and the President's
ability to use military force abroad. Part III discusses the procedural
mechanisms used by the judiciary to abstain from reviewing the constitu-
tionality of presidential uses of force. Part IV applies the law to the Cen-
tral American cases. This Note concludes that Presidents regularly
exceed their constitutional authority in foreign affairs and war-making
with the implied consent of the judiciary.
I. Cases Challenging the Constitutionality of Presidential
Foreign Policy and Military Actions in
Central America
Two of the more significant cases brought to limit President Rea-
gan's foreign policy and military actions in Central America are Crockett
6. A large number of cases came to the courts concerning the Vietnam War. See, &g.,
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Har-
rington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973); Mottola
v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S.
1042 (1970); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1973); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp.
689 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970).
7. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
8. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
9. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other grounds,
770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (without disapproving the basis for the district court's dismissal
of the case, the appellate court chose to rely on other grounds for dismissal).
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v. Reagan"0 and Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan.1 In Crockett v. Reagan,
twenty-nine members of Congress brought suit against the Reagan Ad-
ministration for violations of the War Powers Resolution 2 and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961."3 The plaintiffs alleged the Administra-
tion's supply of financial aid, military equipment, and military advisors
to the government of El Salvador violated federal law.14 Without ever
reaching the merits of these claims, the court dismissed the War Powers
Resolution cause of action as presenting a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion,15 and also dismissed the Foreign Assistance Act cause of action
under the doctrine of equitable discretion.' 6
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan was a suit by members of Congress, cit-
izens and residents of Nicaragua, and residents of Florida. In this case,
the district court dismissed alleged violations of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, the National Security Act,' 7 and the Boland Amendment" as non-
justiciable political questions. 9 Similarly, the court also dismissed tort
allegations by the Nicaraguan defendants seeking relief from terrorist at-
tacks and torture as nonjusticiable political questions.2" The nuisance
action brought by the Florida residents seeking to close paramilitary
training camps was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.2 Without
approving or disapproving the district court's finding that these claims
presented nonjusticiable political questions, the court of appeals upheld
the lower court's dismissal of the suit on a variety of other procedural
grounds.22
10. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
11. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
12. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1961).
14. 558 F. Supp. at 896.
15. Id. at 896-901.
16. Id. at 902-03.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 956-970 (1982).
18. Boland Amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982). The
Boland Amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropriations Act prohibited the
Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency from using funds provided under the
Act for military activities leading to the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
19. 568 F. Supp. at 600. See infra notes 122-144 and accompanying text.
20. 568 F. Supp. at 601-02.
* 21. Id. at 602.
* 22. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
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II. Substantive Restraints on Waging War
A. The Constitutional Allocation of Foreign Affairs and War Powers
1. The Framers' Intent
The allocation of distinct powers to different branches of govern-
ment-the separation of powers-is one of the principal underlying theo-
ries of the Constitution.23 The Framers used separation of powers to
allow for a strong Executive while preventing an excessive concentration
of power in the Executive or any other branch of government.24 The doc-
trine was designed particularly to avoid the types of excesses attributed
to the British monarch.2 5
The Constitution states, "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
declare war .... ,2 It was not by accident that the Framers granted to a
legislative body, and not the Executive, the power to initiate wars. The
Constitution also delegates other significant foreign affairs and war pow-
ers to the legislative branch: (1) granting letters of marque and repri-
sal;27 (2) raising and supporting an army and navy; 28 (3) regulating
commerce with foreign nations;29 and (4) making all laws "necessary and
proper" to carry out its assigned powers.30 The Constitution also re-
quires Senate ratification of treaties negotiated by the executive branch,
Senate confirmation of executive appointments, and Senate approval of
ambassadors to foreign nations.
3'
The Constitution does grant the executive branch specific powers in
the arena of foreign affairs and war-making: first, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces;32 second, the President is au-
thorized to negotiate treaties;33 third, the President has vested in him or
23. Courts have recognized that the separation of powers is one of the major foundational
elements of the system of government under the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
25. Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, in 3
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WIDENING CONTEXT 521, 560-61 (R.
Falk ed. 1972) [hereinafter VIETNAM: THE WIDENING CONTEXT].
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 5, & 11.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Letters of marque and reprisal were a means of pro-
viding private persons with government authority to capture ships and cargo of foreign
citizens.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 12 & 13. Raising and supporting an army refers to both
financial support and conscription.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Regulating commerce with foreign nations refers to the
managing of trade relationships and the initiation of trade embargoes.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause is an expansive
provision giving Congress broad authority to implement the provisions of the Constitution.
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
32. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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her all executive powers;34 and fourth, the President must faithfully exe-
cute the laws of the land.35 Some Presidents have argued that the combi-
nation of express and implied powers granted to the Executive by the
Constitution gives them the power to use military force at will.36
The Framers intended the initiation of force abroad to be made not
by the President alone, but by the entire Congress prior to the occurrence
of hostilities, subject to the President's signature or veto. 37 The Presi-
dent, however, would have the ability to defend the Nation without seek-
ing congressional approval.38 This desire to give the President sufficient
authority to act swiftly to defend the Nation against attack led the Fram-
ers to amend the language of an earlier draft of the Constitution. The
earlier draft gave Congress the power to make war; the phrase actually
34. The Executive Vesting Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
36. Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdictionally Attack-
able, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 651, 655-62. (R. Falk ed. 1969)
[hereinafter THE VIETNAM WAR]. Professor Velvel commented that President Johnson be-
lieved the Constitution empowered Presidents to fight any war necessary to the Nation's for-
eign policy. President Truman, in sending troops to Korea, felt similarly. Truman's
spokesperson said, "The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States, has full control over the use thereof." A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 20-21.
37. Reveley, supra note 25, at 562. Justice Story wrote:
It should.., be difficult in a republic to declare war, but not to make peace. The
representatives of the people are to lay the taxes to support a war, and therefore
should be consulted, as to its time, and the ways and means of making it effective.
The co-operation of all the branches of legislative power ought, upon principle, to be
required in this the highest act of legislation, as it is in all others. Indeed, there might
be a propriety even in enforcing still greater restrictions, as by requiring a concur-
rence of two thirds of both houses.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 410-11 (1833),
reprinted in A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 38.
In 1848, when Congress censured President Polk for initiating the Mexican-American
War without congressional authorization, then-Representative Abraham Lincoln said:
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was
dictated as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involv-
ing and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that
the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the
most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitu-
tion that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 451 n.7 (1957), reprinted
in A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 11. See also Velvel, supra note 36, at 653.
38. Alexander Hamilton wrote:
"The Congress shall have the power to declare war"; the plain meaning of which is
that it is the peculiar and exclusive duty of Congress, when the nation is atpeace, to
change that state into a state of war; whether from calculations of policy, or from
provocations or injuries received; in other words, it belongs to Congress only to go to
war. But when a foreign nation declares or openly and avowedly makes war upon
the United States, they are then by the very fact already at war, and any declaration
on the part of Congress is nugatory: it is at least unnecessary.
A. HAMILTON, WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 249-50 (H. Lodge 2d ed. 1903), reprinted
in A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis in original).
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adopted gives Congress the power to declare war. 9
The Constitution's allocation of power to the Congress to grant "let-
ters of marque and reprisal,"'  a congressional authorization of the use of
force by private parties in undeclared wars, indicates the Framers' inten-
tion to have Congress control the initiation of any hostilities against an-
other nation.41 Moreover, as the Nation had neither a standing army nor
a standing navy, and the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
raise an army or call forth the militia,42 the Framers intended military
action to require congressional approval. Thus, the Framers gave to
Congress the authority to initiate all known methods of using force in all
situations except the urgent defense of the Nation.
The above analysis is consistent with the Framers' intent. The
Framers had recently survived the Revolutionary War. Blame for the
war was placed on the British king, an executive with nearly absolute
power to determine foreign policy and the use of military force.43 The
Articles of Confederation,' adopted immediately after the Revolution-
ary War, vested all power in the legislative body to avoid a strong Execu-
tive.4" After a few years, however, "legislative despotism" 6 led national
leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and James Madison to
advocate having an executive as well as a legislative branch, with each
keeping the abuses of the other in check.47
Moreover, in a democratic society, an Executive should not be al-
lowed to independently commit the Nation to hostile relations with an-
39. E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 35 (1982).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 11.
41. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE
L.J. 672, 694-702 (1972).
42. Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, [hereinafter
Note, Power to Commit Forces] in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR supra note 36, at 616, 621 n.29. See
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16:
The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o raise and support Armies, but no Appropria-
tion of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; [t]o provide
and maintain a Navy; [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces; [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia, to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [tio provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the Militia and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress.
Professor Lofgren asserts that, "[t]aken together.., the grants to Congress of power over the
declaration of war and issuance of letters of marque and reprisal likely convinced contempo-
raries ... that the new Congress would have nearly complete authority over the commence-
ment of war." Lofgren, supra note 41, at 700.
43. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 37-38.
44. U.S. ART. OF CONFEDERATION.
45. E. KEYNES, supra note 39, at 28.
46. Id. at 18. Legislative despotism is a phrase used to describe the powerful and un-
checked power of the legislative branch of government under the Articles of Confederation.
47. Id.
other country. When the people of the Nation will be called upon to
make economic and physical sacrifices, such decisions should rest with
the legislative body, which is more representative of the people than is a
sole Executive." Further, the use of force against another nation should
require an expression of popular approval because of the moral and legal
consequences. 9 Therefore, decisions to use hostile force against foreign
sovereigns are better made by the legislative rather than the executive
branch of government.
2. Contemporary Interpretations
The Constitution is somewhat vague on the allocation of foreign re-
lations and war powers between the legislative and executive branches of
government.5 0 The federal judiciary has bolstered presidential claims to
exclusive control over foreign affairs. In cases such as United States v.
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.,51 courts have argued that the executive
branch has the primary responsibility for foreign policy decisions. 2
48. Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 620. Legislative bodies are more
representative than sole Executives because they are composed of multiple members, and con-
sequently, are more likely to represent the diversity of views held by the population at large.
49. Id.
50. E. KEYNES, supra note 39, at 33.
51. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
52. Id. Justice Sutherland was building on the statement first made by then Congressman,
later Chief Justice, Marshall in 1800 that "[tlhe President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative." 10 ANNALS oF CoNG. 613 (1800) (statement
of Congressman Marshall). Although this view focuses on the President as the Nation's pri-
mary representative in foreign powers, it does not suggest that the executive branch is solely
responsible for the determination of foreign policy.
The defendant, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, was charged with violating an arms embargo
proclaimed by the President pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress that authorized such
presidential action. Curtiss-Wright put forth the defense that the legislative branch had im-
properly delegated its powers to the President. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
executive branch has more power in foreign than in domestic affairs, and found no constitu-
tional violation.
Justice Sutherland, the author of the majority's opinion, first pointed out that the federal
government, rather than the states, necessarily has foreign affairs powers. Curtiss- Wright, 299
U.S. at 315-18. Second, Justice Sutherland argued that the President, rather than Congress,
had the primary responsibility for foreign affairs:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation.... It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such
an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which,
of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embar-
rassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legisla-
tion which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
Svrinz 1987"1 COVERT WARS
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Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright, expanding presiden-
tial powers in the field of foreign affairs, has been criticized53 and has not
been followed in subsequent decisions. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer,54 for example, the Court ruled that the war powers conferred
on the President were very limited.5
Although it is sometimes argued that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause 6 authorizes presidential plenary power over the military, the bet-
ter view is that this Clause does not confer substantive power on the
President to determine whether the Nation should initiate hostilities with
foreign nations. 7 Professor Henkin has commented that if the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause grants the Executive unlimited power over the
military, the armed forces would be the President's private army.5 8 Pro-
fessor Wormuth has argued that the Commander-in-Chief Clause does
not grant Presidents the authority to use force against foreign sovereigns
whenever they perceive a threat to the peace and security of the Nation. 9
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and free-
dom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of
war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered
by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of
harmful results.... This consideration, in connection with what we have already said
on the subject, discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of govern-
mental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be
governed.
Id. at 319-22.
53. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 24-25, 45-65 (1972).
54. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55. In Youngstown, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate
the Nation's steel mills to prevent a strike during the Korean War. The Court stated that
neither the President's position as Commander-in-Chief, nor the Vesting or Take-Care Clauses
gave the President such broad powers; the Court held that the President cannot usurp the
legislative functions assigned to Congress by the Constitution. Id. at 587-89.
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
57. The argument that the Commander-in-Chief Clause authorizes Presidents to use the
military at will eliminates the role of representative government and therefore amounts to a
claim that military authority is supreme over civilian authority-a proposition contrary to the
very foundations of United States government. Velvel, supra note 36, at 659-60.
The better view is that the President has the authority under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause to determine war strategy, but may not unilaterally decide to initiate a war or use force
against a foreign sovereign. Moreover, to be effective this limitation on the Commander-in-
Chief Clause extends to foreign policy decisions which may lead to the use of force against a
foreign sovereign. See A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 70; L. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 53-54.
58. L. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 53-54.
59. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution in 2 THE VIET-
NAM WAR, supra note 36, at 711, 715-16. Professor Wormuth has drawn an analogy to the
commander of a submarine who believes that the peace and security of the Nation require him
to fire nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union. Just as the commander of such a vessel would have
no legal authority to make this decision, neither would the President as commander of the
army and navy have this authority. This analogy does not, of course, conflict with presidential
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commander-in-Chief
Clause, 60 and the Executive Vesting Clause6" as limited grants of presi-
dential power, because many functions, including lawmaking and declar-
ing war, are exclusively within Congress' authority.62 In Youngstown,
Justice Jackson expanded this notion to suggest that there are some areas
in which the Executive has exclusive authority, some in which Congress
has exclusive authority, and in other areas, there is a "zone of twilight"
in which either the distribution of power is uncertain or the President
and Congress have concurrent authority.63 Some scholars have argued
that foreign and military affairs necessarily fall into this zone of
twilight.64
During the Vietnam War, a prominent group of legal scholars
drafted the Yale Papers for presentation to Congress.65 Commenting on
Justice Jackson's concurrent powers argument in the context of foreign
responsibility for defending the Nation; just as the submarine commander can use force to
defend the submarine against attack, the President can use force when the United States is
attacked.
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. .
62. 343 U.S. at 587-89. In his concurring opinion in Youngstown, Justice Jackson ex-
plained why he felt that executive powers must be limited:
The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the
forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its
evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating
their new Executive in his image. Continental European examples were no more
appealing. And if we seek instruction from our own times, we can match it only
from the executive power in those governments we disparagingly describe as totali-
tarian. I cannot accept the view that [the Executive Vesting Clause] is a grant in
bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presiden-
tial office of the generic powers thereafter stated.
Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 637.
64. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Justice Jackson's twilight zone analysis,
like Justice Sutherland's, viewed all foreign relations powers as belonging somewhere in the
federal government:
The broad statement that the Federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Con-
stitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by
the states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the Federal govern-
ment, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states .... And since
the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have
been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source.
299 U.S. at 315-16.
Justice Jackson viewed the total of foreign and military affairs powers which any nation
has as being greater than the sum of those powers specifically granted to the Congress and
President under our Constitution. Since there is no indication where those powers reside, they
must be in his "twilight zone" of concurrent powers. Indochina: The Constitutional Crises -
Part II (The Yale Papers), 116 CONG. REc. 16,478 (1970).
65. 116 CONG. REC. 16,478 (1970).
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affairs and war powers, these experts suggested an allocation of power
between the legislative and executive branches on the basis of: "(1) the
special competences of each; and (2) the probable internal consequences
of external actions.",66 The President is capable of fast, efficient, and de-
cisive action67 whereas Congress' decisionmaking is rather ponderous.68
Congressional decisions are arrived at more slowly than executive deci-
sions because they reflect the diversity of views held by the people of the
country and involve multiparty deliberation, compromise and consen-
sus. 69 Consequently, only those foreign and military decisions that re-
quire speedy action should be made exclusively by the President; all
other decisions fall within the realm of congressional power.70
The Framers intended to vest most of the authority over war and
other related foreign policy decisions in the legislative branch. The
Framers provided for presidential use of force without congressional con-
sent only when necessary to defend the Nation against attack.71 More-
over, although the Court is usually unwilling to limit the scope of
presidential war powers, it has on occasion indicated that Presidents can-
not usurp the legislative branch's role in determining the Nation's war
and war-related policies.7 2
3. What Is War?
Given that Congress has the power to declare war, the definition of
war is important in determining which branch of government has the
power to initiate armed conflicts. Not long after the Constitution was
adopted Justice Washington wrote "that every contention by force be-
tween two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their re-
spective governments, is not only war, but public war."173 Furthermore,
66. Id. at 16,479. One example of an internal consequence of an external action was the
social unrest which was created by the unpopularity of the Vietnam War.
67. The Executive is capable of making quick decisions, unlike the legislative branch, be-
cause there is no need to convene a large group of decisionmakers to reach a consensus or
majority decision.
68. 116 CONG. REC. at 16,479.
69. Id.
70. Id. Applying this test, the report concluded:
(1) When a decision in foreign or military affairs demands speed and decisiveness,
there is a presumption that it is within the exclusive power of the President. (2) All
other decisions are within the power of Congress.... [W]hen the decision entails a
significant commitment of the nation's human, physical, and moral resources, there
is a presumption of congressional exclusivity. The presumption can be rebutted: The
President can unilaterally commit a significant amount of the nation's human, physi-
cal, and moral resources; but he can do so only if there is a clear need for speed and
decisiveness.
Id. (emphasis in original),
71. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 79 (1952).
73. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800).
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in Little v. Barreme,74 the Court held that President Jefferson did not
have the authority to engage in even limited hostilities beyond those au-
thorized by Congress.75 In 1863, the Court held in The Prize Cases76
that President Lincoln did not exceed his authority when he recognized
that a state of war existed with the Confederacy several months before
there was congressional action.77 This ruling did not violate the Fram-
ers' views because the President was acting to defend the Nation against
an insurrection by hostile forces.78 The Pize Cases, therefore, do not
stand for judicial approval of presidential use of hostile force on the basis
that such an action does not constitute war.7 9
Some Presidents have used hostile force abroad to protect United
States citizens and property belonging to United States citizens.8 0 Presi-
dent Taft, for example, argued that he had the power to initiate hostilities
because as long as such force is neutral with respect to foreign political
entities, it will not constitute war.8" It is pure fantasy to view the use of
74. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
75. The Court ruled that President Jefferson had exceeded his authority when he ordered
the seizure of a private French vessel. Id. at 177-79.
76. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
77. Id. at 669-79.
78. In The Prize Cases, Justice Nelson argued in his dissent that only Congress could
commit the United States to a legal state of war; without legislative action, hostilities might
exist, but they could not have legal significance. Id. at 686 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
More than 30 years later in The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1897), the Court agreed
with Justice Nelson's view and distinguished between war in the legal sense and war in the
material sense. Where Cuban insurgents were fighting the Spanish government the Court rec-
ognized the existence of hostilities without referring to the conflict as a war. See also In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59-64 (1890).
79. Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad, in 3 VIETNAM:
THE WIDENING CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 510-11.
To defend the Nation by repelling invasions, the Framers intended that the President need
not take the time to obtain a congressional declaration of war. The President was intended to
have "the responsibility to repel sudden attacks on the nation's territory and armed forces,
protect citizens' lives and property, supervise military strategy, and superintend the armed
forces that Congress provides, but the Framers did not envision the President's committing
troops to foreign wars without prior congressional consent." E. KEYNES, supra note 39, at 20.
Some commentators argue that though the President has the power to respond to an
attack, even those actions should not be disproportionate to the assault. Moreover, once the
country is secure from imminent threats, further military action should occur only after con-
gressional debate and authorization, otherwise the constitutionally mandated opportunity of
Congress to weigh the potential gains and losses associated with a prolonged armed conflict
would be nullified, See, eg., Reveley, supra note 25, at 564-66.
80. Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 632-33. See infra note 81 and accom-
panying text; see also A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 23-25, where the author discusses President
Eisenhower's use of troops in Lebanon in 1958, and President Johnson's use of troops in the
Congo in 1964 and again in the Dominican Republic in 1965, on the basis of the need to
protect United States citizens or property.
81. President Taft, for example, justified his use of force in Nicaragua in 1912 by distin-
guishing between intervention, which includes interference in the political affairs of another
state, and interposition, which is supposedly restricted to the protection of persons and prop-
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force by the United States as neutral:82 certainly no one would view the
use of force by another sovereign to protect its persons or property in the
United States as a neutral act rather than an act of war.
It has also been argued that Presidents can use force to intervene at
the request of a foreign government to help quell civil strife, as this alleg-
edly does not constitute war. 3 The Framers, however, attempted to pre-
vent the Executive from independently committing the Nation to the use
of force abroad8" and there is no reason to believe this concern should be
treated differently because it aids a foreign government fighting its own
people.
4. Congressional Authorization of War
Until the mid-nineteenth century, Presidents gave considerable def-
erence to Congress in matters dealing with the use of military force. 5
For example, Congress debated the neutrality proclamation proposed by
President Washington in 1798,86 and Presidents Jefferson and Madison
acknowledged that the President was bound to defer to Congress before
using military force.87 In 1799, the Supreme Court, in Bas v. Tingy, 8
approved a congressionally authorized use of force in a limited or partial
war.
Before the Civil War, Presidents generally deferred to Congress' war
powers. When President Polk provoked the war with Mexico in 1848, he
was censured by Congress.89 By the 1850's, however, the Executive be-
came more assertive in the war powers arena as both Congress and the
judiciary began to abdicate their constitutional responsibilities. In
erty. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 16, 151 n.22 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, RIGHT TO
PROTECr CITIZENS IN FOREIGN CouNTRIES By LANDING FORCES 23-34, 40,44,48 (3d rev.
ed. 1934).
82. In 1903, for example, President Roosevelt sent troops to Panama to make sure a gov-
ernment more favorably disposed towards the United States than Columbia controlled the
Panamanian Isthmus. Since then, Presidents have used force to help particular political fac-
tions in many other countries, particularly Caribbean nations such as Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 634-35.
83. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 86. Moreover, intervention would probably be illegal
under international law, as the existence of civil disorder calls into question the legitimacy of
the government as the representative of the state. Id.
84. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
85. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 269-72 (1976).
86. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 9.
87. Id. at 32.
88. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). Bas involved the capture of ships during a period of limited
hostilities between France and the United States. In a subsequent case dealing with the same
limited war, Chief Justice Marshall held that the President must abide by Congress' instruc-
tions regarding the degree and manner in which this limited war was to be conducted. Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
89. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 11.
Durand v. Hollins,9" for example, a circuit court upheld an American
attack on Nicaragua in 1854.91 Since the turn of the twentieth century,
Presidents have increasingly used force without judicial condemnation.92
Two of the most significant constitutional problems created by presi-
dential use of force are: (1) whether a congressional resolution allowing
the President to use force under limited conditions is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative branch responsibilities; and (2) whether resolu-
tions can be valid when passed by a Congress facing afait accompli.93
Most congressional resolutions authorizing presidential uses of hos-
tile force are extremely broad, allowing a wide latitude of presidential
discretion over when to use armed force.94 Arguably, these resolutions
are unconstitutional declarations of war contingent on presidential dis-
cretion.95 The wide latitude provided to Presidents puts them in the po-
sition of creating the standards and rules for when they will use force;
90. 8 F. Cas. I11 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
91. Durand concerned a request by the United States for reparations for the destruction of
property belonging to a United States company, and for an apology for insults to a United
States consul. The court held that the 1854 bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua was a
legitimate exercise of the sovereign power to defend citizens and property, under customary
international law as it then existed, even though there was no congressional sanction of the
action.
92. Reveley, supra note 25, at 538-39. President Roosevelt used force in 1903 to help the
rebels establish the nation of Panama. President Wilson sought, but did not obtain, congres-
sional approval for the arming of merchant vessels prior to American entry into World War I;
nevertheless, he ordered the vessels armed, knowing that it would lead to war. Id. at 540 n.55.
Ignoring a number of neutrality statutes that existed prior to the entry of the United States
into World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 exchanged destroyers for British
bases in the Western Atlantic. In 1941, President Roosevelt occupied Greenland and Iceland,
ordered the Navy to convoy ships carrying supplies to Britain, and even declared an air and
sea war against the Axis powers in the Atlantic. Id. at 538-39.
Use of military force in the Korean War, though pursuant to a resolution of the United
Nations, was never authorized by Congress. Id. at 541 n.58.
93. In this context, thefait accompli problem refers to the difficulty Congress has in de-
bating a declaration permitting the Presidential use of force when hostilities already exist. See
infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
94. Reveley, supra note 25, at 541 n.59.
95. Wormuth, supra note 59, at 792. Professor Wormuth has argued that such resolu-
tions fail to meet constitutional standards:
If Congress determines the general policy to be pursued, it may authorize the Presi-
dent to determine the facts which call the congressional policy into play, or to make
detailed rules which apply the policy established by Congress to particular sets of
facts. But Congress may not pass contingent legislation without specifying the cir-
cumstances in which it is to be invoked, nor may it authorize the President to make
rules on a topic without supplying standards to guide him. To do either of these
things would be to attempt to delegate legislative power.
Id. Professor Wormuth concludes that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as well as other similar
resolutions dealing with Formosa and the Middle East, were illegitimate delegations of legisla-
tive power: "Congress did not express a will as to war or peace. Not only the language of the
resolutions but the debates show beyond doubt that Congress intended to transfer the power of
decision to the President." Id. at 796.
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but rulemaking activity is essentially legislative in nature and within the
exclusive purview of the legislative branch of government.96
Congress faces afait accompli when the President has made foreign
policy and military decisions without any delegation of authority by Con-
gress: the President presents the legislative branch with a state of war, or
a foreign policy leading to a state of war, prior to legislative debate and
congressional policy determination.97 Fait accompli situations effec-
tively eliminate any meaningful decisionmaking by Congress. Congress
frequently acquiesces to the Executive's initiation of force to maintain
the country's reputation and to avoid the difficulty of mustering the effort
to change an existing situation. 98
Some lower courts have found that certain congressional actions,
such as joint or concurrent resolutions, appropriations of funds, and pro-
visions for a military draft, may sufficiently authorize the use of hostile
force to satisfy the constitutional requirement for a congressional decla-
ration of war.99 Courts hearing Vietnam cases, for example, often
pointed to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as sufficient congressional au-
thorization for the Vietnam War. °0
Despite these lower court holdings, the Supreme Court, in Greene v.
McElroy, 0 1 held that where the constitutionality of an action is question-
able, congressional ratification must be explicit and demonstrate "careful
and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and im-
plementing our laws." 10 The Greene rule, which was recognized in
some of the later Vietnam War cases,103 requires legislation to identify
96. Id. at 792.
97. See Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 641.
98. Id. President Roosevelt presented Congress with afait accompli when, after Congress
denied him the funds to send the navy on a tour across the Pacific, he sent the navy across the
Pacific and told Congress that they would have to appropriate more funds if they wanted to get
the navy back to the United States. See L. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 109. More recently,
Congress found it difficult to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War once a full-
scale war was already in existence. Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 641.
99. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Berk v. Laird, 317 F.
Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ("The entire course of legislation shows that Congress knew
what it was doing, and that it intended to have American troops fight in Vietnam.").
100. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971),
the court stated:
[The resolution] was expressed in broad language which clearly showed the state of
mind of the Congress and its intention fully to implement and support the military
and naval actions taken by and planned to be taken by the President at that time in
Southeast Asia, and as might be required in the future "to prevent further
aggression."
101. 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (dealing with congressional ratification of Department of Defense
administrative security programs).
102. Id. at 506-07. See also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding a congressional
appropriation insufficient to ratify all executive actions funded by that appropriation).
103. In Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 464
F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972) (the plaintiff did not possess standing to bring suit), Judge Sweigert
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clearly the presidential action it is authorizing or ratifying." 4
A similarly unconvincing argument is that knowing acquiescence by
Congress meets the constitutional burden for congressional action.105
This fails to reflect the constitutional responsibilities imposed on Con-
gress. It also fails to recognize the significance of shifting the burden of
securing a majority in Congress from those favoring ratification of a pres-
idential decision to those disfavoring such an action.10 6 If appropria-
tions, or even acquiescence, could authorize or ratify presidential use of
force, then the Framers' intention of having Congress check the power of
the Executive would be ill served. 10 7
B. Treaties and International Law
Many United States treaties, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact,"0 8 the
United Nations Charter,"0 9 and the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance,110 allow the use of armed force only in self-de-
recognized that the Constitution may require a congressional declaration of war or "an equally
explicit congressional expression" before military hostilities can be initiated. Id. at 553. The
court indicated that absent such explicit authorization there would arguably be a "usurpation
by the President or an abdication by the Congress--or, perhaps, both." Id.
In Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court noted:
[We could not be] unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to ap-
propriate money or to draft men a Congressman is not necessarily approving of the
continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers
to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and con-
tinuation might vote for the military appropriations and for the draft measures be-
cause he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting. An
honorable, decent, compassionate act of aiding those already in peril is no proof of
consent to the actions that placed and continued them in that dangerous posture.
We should not construe votes cast in pity and piety as though they were votes freely
given to express consent.
104. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 90.
105. Id. at 89-90.
106. Id. Enacting legislation is a slow and not always successful process. Consequently,
shifting the burden of securing a majority of Congress from those favoring to those disfavoring
presidential actions significantly increases the autonomy of the Executive.
107. See Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 646.
108. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, July 24, 1929, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 769, also known as
the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, was one of the earliest treaties signed by the
United States calling for restraint in the use of military force. Article I pledges the signatories
to "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Id. at art. 1.
109. U.N. CHARTER, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. Article 2 of the Charter
contains the most pertinent provision: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
110. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (1947), although a mutual defense pact, also obliges its
signatories to refrain from the use of force. The signatories "condemn war and undertake in
their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force ... ." Id. at art. 1.
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fense11t and specifically outlaw the use of force to settle international
disputes and to influence official domestic policies in other nations.
112
Treaties are binding and part of the law of the land under article VI of
the Constitution. 13 Although the Supreme Court has ruled that Con-
gress can abrogate treaties, 4 it has never extended this power to the
111. Presidents have often justified their use of force in foreign lands on the basis of being
bound by mutual defense treaties. Note, Power to Commit Forces, supra note 42, at 636-37.
However, many of our mutual defense pacts have included language which says force will be
used to aid other nations "in accordance with . . . constitutional processes." A. THOMAS,
supra note 1, at 119 (citing NATO Treaty, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SuRF. 159-62 (1949). Scholars
have differed on whether the President's use of force without prior congressional approval is
legitimate. Scholars arguing that such actions are legal base their opinions on the notion that
the President has the ability to use force in situations short of war. Id. This requires defining
some military conflicts as not constituting war, a questionable construction of the Constitu-
tion. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. The Framers intended to provide for
presidential use of force without congressional approval only in situations of national self-
defense. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 37.
Other commentators have argued that mutual defense treaties cannot constitutionally
bind the United States to the military aid of another country, see Note, Power to Commit
Forces, supra note 42, at 641-43, because the Constitution gave the power to initiate wars to the
Congress, not to the Senate or the President, the only parties involved in binding the Nation to
a treaty.
Of all the Nation's treaties, mutual defense pacts are but a small percentage, and probably
an equal number of treaties restrain the Nation from using force in all situations except for
self-defense. A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 86. An interesting question which has never been
addressed is whether a mutual defense pact or a self-defense treaty takes precedence when the
two are in conflict.
112. The purpose of these agreements was pointed out by Professor Wright:
The Hague Conventions, the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
the Nuremberg Charter and the United Nations Charter have progressively devel-
oped international law to "outlaw" war in the traditional sense .... [I]nternational
law permits states to use force in international relations only for individual or collec-
tive self-defense against armed attack or in support of sanctioning action authorized
by the United Nations. Force may not be used as an instrument of national policy or
for the settlement of international disputes.
Wright, supra note 79, at 518-19.
113. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
114. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress has the ability to abrogate treaties. The Court held:
[Treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of Congress. By the Consti-
tution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the
United States are both declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount
authority is given to one over the other .... In either case the last expression of the
sovereign will must control.
Id. at 600. Explaining that a sovereign nation cannot give up its ability to modify its interna-
tional agreements without giving up its independence, the Court held that a treaty is "subject
executive branch." 5 Presidents, therefore, are constitutionally required
to faithfully execute treaties.
In The Paquete Habana,"6 the Supreme Court held that interna-
tional law is also part of the law of the land.' 17 The Court noted that
rules commonly and historically accepted by most civilized societies can
result in an obligation to follow those rules."' Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that the President must at least abide by interna-
tional law unless Congress explicitly authorizes a contrary action.1 9 Be-
cause the use of force for political purposes-such as "military pressure
in aid of diplomacy, territorial acquisition, or intervention to influence
the policy or ideology of a foreign government" -- violates interna-
to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal." Id. (quoting
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).
Though the Court has never addressed the merits of presidential authority to abrogate a
treaty, the rationale which justifies a congressional abrogation would not apply to executive
actions. Moreover, the President's duty to execute faithfully the laws of the land suggests that
the executive branch has an affirmative obligation to enforce treaties.
115. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), which raised the issue of the President's
authority to terminate the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan. The
district court held on the merits that the President could not terminate the treaty while the
court of appeals held on the merits that the President could terminate the treaty. The Supreme
Court dismissed the case as being nonjusticiable.
116. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Court held that the capture of
fishing vessels belonging to a Spanish subject in Havana during the Spanish-American War
was an unlawful violation of international law, and that customary international law protected
coastal fishermen and their vessels and cargo from capture as prizes of war.
117. Id. at 700.
118. Id. at 711-12. The Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is
no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Id. at 700. Commenting on the moral as well as the legal basis for recognizing international
law as part of the law of the land in the United States, the Court quoted from The Scotia, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871), where Justice Strong said of the law of the sea: "That law is of
universal obligation .... Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of
civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but
because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at
711.
119. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 115 (1852); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
It has also been argued that breaches of international law are sufficiently serious to require
congressional participation:
MIf the United States is to engage in an armed intervention in a foreign nation to
protect only its political interests, and by so doing will commit a breach of interna-
tional law, it is thought that such derogation from law with its serious consequences
should have the support of Congress. The peoples' will as expressed through their
representatives in the legislative branch should prevail.
A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 72.
120. Wright, supra note 79, at 512.
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tional law, such use of force by the President, absent congressional ac-
tion, also violates the Constitution.
121
IH. Justiciability of War and Foreign Affairs Powers
Though a significant number of cases raising foreign affairs or war
powers issues have been brought in federal courts, most are dismissed on
the ground of nonjusticiablity.1 22 The predominant theory supporting
nonjusticiability is the political question doctrine.
1 23
In Baker v. Carr,124 the Supreme Court attempted to establish
guidelines for the application of the political question doctrine. The
Court indicated that cases are nonjusticiable when they involve:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.125
121. Professor Wright has written specifically about the use of military force abroad and
international law. He calls for an explicit rule of constitutional law that the President be
required to observe international legal standards: "In this way the world rule of law might be
promoted, national security enhanced, and the opportunity offered for democratic processes to
influence important diplomatic and military decisions." Id. at 520.
The use of force for self-defense, to secure reparations from or to prevent future unlawful
acts of other nations, and to protect citizens and property abroad, may have been legitimate
under the customary international law of a previous era where treaties restraining nations from
using force to settle their disputes did not exist. However, that customary international law
has been expressly superceded by specific written international agreements such as the United
Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 109.
122. See infra notes 145-184 and accompanying text. A nonjusticiable issue is present
when a court declines to resolve a controversy, or finds that no controversy exists. See BAL-
LENTINE'S LAW DIC'IONARY 697 (3d Ed. 1969).
123. The political question doctrine has been described as a principle of extraordinary judi-
cial abstention that is applied when there are "claims that the political branches have failed to
live up to constitutional requirements or limitations." Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the
United States: "Political Questions" in 3 VIETNAM WAR: THE WIDENING CONTEXT, supra
note 25, at 625, 626.
Judicial review of actions by the political branches of government-the legislative and
executive branches-began with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury
established the principle that under the Constitution, the Supreme Court delineates the author-
ity of the different branches of government. Id. at 173-79. The political question doctrine,
however, is an exception to this general rule because it legitimizes judicial decisions to abstain
from delineating the limits of the other branches of government.
124. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
125. Id. at 217.
Although the political question doctrine has been intensely criti-
cized as a doctrine without constitutional support, 12 6 it has also been an-
alyzed in terms of four distinct theories: a classical theory,127 a
functional theory, 128 a prudential theory, 129 and an excessive judicial
126. See Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, in
3 VIETNAM WAR: THE WIDENING CONTEXT supra note 25, at 654:
[The political question doctrine] is a cluster of disparate legal rules and principles
any of which may, in a given case, dictate a result on the merits, lead to dismissal for
want of article three jurisdiction, prevent a party from airing an issue the favorable
resolution of which might terminate the litigation in his favor, or authorize a federal
court in its discretion and as a matter of prudence to decline jurisdiction to hear a
case or decide an issue.
127. The classical theory explains the traditional application of the political question doc-
trine to issues involving the separation of powers: whether a particular substantive "matter
should be left to the unlimited discretion of the responsible branch," Schwartz & McCormack,
The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEX. L.
REv. 1033, 1041 (1968), or whether "the Constitution has committed the determination of the
issue to another agency of government than the courts," Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1959). Under Baker v. Carr, the classical view
is represented by the criterion of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department." 369 U.S. at 217.
This analysis leaves the courts with considerable discretion. For example, though the
Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to declare wars, the courts have repeatedly
found cases questioning presidentially initiated wars to be nonjusticiable on political question
grounds. See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text. However, in Baker v. Carr, despite
the Constitution's silence on the issue of apportionment, the Court found there was no textual
commitment to another branch, leaving the Court free to decide the issue. 369 U.S. at 227-37.
See also Velvel, supra note 36, at 684.
This basis for abstention has been interpreted by some commentators as constituting little
more than a label applied by the Court after it has decided that an issue must be left to another
branch of government for determination. Schwartz & McCormack, supra, at 1041-45. Deci-
sions to dismiss cases on political question grounds result in a determination that "the conduct
of the political department involved was constitutionally within its powers, being neither pro-
hibited nor withheld." A. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 93. Consequently, the Court has been
criticized for applying the political question doctrine to Vietnam War cases where it allowed
the President to determine the construction of the Constitution and relevant treaties. Id. Even
with regard to the President's war powers, an area where the Court is more deferential, the
Court can and has ruled that a President's determinations of his or her powers can be incor-
rect. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
128. Professor Scharpf has advocated a functional analysis of the political question doc-
trine. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 566-97 (1966), cited in Moore, The Justiciability of Challenges to the Use of Military
Forces Abroad, in 3 VIETNAM WAR: THE WIDENING CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 631, 636.
Two Baker v. Carr criteria, the "lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [an issue]," and "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," 369 U.S. at 217, provide the basis for the
functional view.
The discoverable standards criterion focuses on the "lack of judicial decisional criteria
and relevant data, and possibly the problem of devising effective judicial remedies." A.
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 98. The nonjudicial discretion criterion supports the principle that
courts should not review the wisdom of a decision by a political branch, but rather should limit
their role to determining whether the branch in question had the authority to make a particu-
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caution theory.
130
lar decision. Issues related to foreign affairs have often been considered policymaking matters
within the authority of the executive. Id. at 99.
129. The prudential view is illuminated in the last three criteria of Baker v. Carr:
[t]he impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
369 U.S. at 217.
One advocate of the prudential view has argued that the Court should abstain from decid-
ing issues on political question grounds whenever the Court senses its own lack of capacity,
based on:
(a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the
sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxi-
ety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should
but will not be; [and] (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability,
the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to
draw strength from.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962).
Professor Bickel's view rests on the notion that there is no constitutional obligation for the
Court to decide cases, and it is free to abstain if, in its practical judgment, the issue is better left
to the political branches. Id.
Other legal scholars, such as Professor Wechsler, have argued instead that the Court is
under a constitutional obligation to determine issues and decide cases, and it does not have the
freedom to abstain on purely practical grounds. See Wechsler, supra note 127, at 6; see also
Schwartz & McCormack, supra note 127, at 1045-52.
130. Another view of the political question doctrine is that its basis lies in judicial caution
rather than legal or philosophical analysis. According to one scholar:
[T]he Court can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution [of power],
and thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor invalidate a function-
ing system with an order which would be ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice
the popular prestige which is the Court's primary source of power. Consequently, it
temporarily relinquishes its task of validation by declaring that the entire matter
involves a 'political question'.
P. STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
EVASION 140-41 (1974).
Two underlying reasons have been given for this view of the political question doctrine:
the Court's reliance on the executive branch for enforcement of its rulings, and the lack of a
social consensus which effectively coerces the Court into abstaining from decisions which
would otherwise be justiciable. Id. at 130, 142. The enforcement problem raises the issue of
whether a court order would be ignored by, or even antagonize the executive branch. An
enforcement problem last occurred in 1832 when President Jackson reportedly said of Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832): "John Mar-
shall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C.
WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 160 (1979). More recently, during the Watergate scan-
dal there was some concern that President Nixon might not turn over the Watergate tapes
when he was ordered to do so by the Court. President Nixon eventually complied, albeit with
some erasures. See T. WHITE, BREACH OF FArTH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 271, 296-
97 (1975).
Professor Bickel's prudential views are in accord with his concern for the lack of social
consensus, but judicial abstention on this basis has been criticized for tending to "isolate [the
Court] ... from the forces which make its decisions responsive to democratic values." Tigar,
supra note 126, at 660.
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Though the political question doctrine is the most signficant impedi-
ment to deciding on the merits cases concerning foreign and military af-
fairs, courts also use other procedural barriers such as lack of standing to
sue.' 31 The standing doctrine focuses on whether the party bringing the
action has suffered some threatened or actual injury "that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."1 32 Standing does not address the is-
sues in a dispute, but only the ability of a party to bring the action.
The Vietnam War cases present several interesting examples of how
the justiciability analysis has been applied, and how this application
changed as the war dragged on and public opposition to its continuance
increased. In Luftig v. McNamara, 3 3 a member of the armed services
sought an injunction against military authorities sending him to Vietnam
because, he claimed, the President lacked authority to conduct the war.
The district court dismissed the suit on the basis that it raised a nonjusti-
ciable political question, 134 and the court of appeals readily affinmed.
135
The first Vietnam case to reach the Supreme Court, Mora v. McNa-
mara, 31 raised issues very similar to those in Luftig. The Court in Mora
denied certiorari, letting stand the appellate court's decision affirming the
district court's dismissal on political question grounds. 137 A 1968 class
action suit brought by Professor Velvel against President Johnson for
[Tihe Court's willingness to regard abstention from decision as a principle in itself
without a clearly-articulated set of reasons for not deciding insulates it from argu-
ments made at its bar by advocates for the persons and interests whose legal rights
are in issue. That is, if the Court looks first to ill-defined considerations of appropri-
ateness in deciding whether to decide, and then seizes upon the justification for not
deciding which lies most readily at hand, it will become impossible for counsel to
argue out in a rational way the reasons why not deciding is or is not appropriate....
It will do nothing save nurture legal fictions if decisional rationales, or rationales for
avoiding constitutional decision, are transmuted into mere devices to be employed in
the service of other values.
Id. at 665-66 (footnotes omitted).
131. A party has standing to sue if a court determines that the party has sufficient stake in
obtaining a judicial resolution. Factors considered by courts in determining whether a party is
sufficiently affected are whether the litigant is injured or threatened with injury, and whether
the litigant is the proper party to bring the suit. Standing is denied to prevent judicial entan-
glement in abstract disagreements over administrative policies and to protect agencies from
judicial interference before an administrative decision is formalized. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1260 (5th ed. 1979). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 218 (W.D.N.C.
1977); Guidry v. Roberts, 331 So. 2d 44, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
132. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1975).
133. 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966).
134. Id.
135. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
136. 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
137. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Stewart wrote:
These are large and deeply troubling questions. Whether the Court would ultimately
reach them depends, of course, upon the resolution of serious preliminary issues of
justiciability. We cannot make these problems go away simply by refusing to hear
the case of three obscure Army privates. I intimate not even tentative views upon
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conducting the Vietnam War without a congressional declaration of war
was similarly dismissed.
138
In a second group of cases, federal courts continued to state that the
validity of the Vietnam War presented nonjusticiable political questions,
yet in addition, also decided that the President's actions were legiti-
mate. 139 Eventually, however, the political question doctrine was held
not to bar judicial review of congressional authorization for the Vietnam
War. 'I Towards the end of the war, some federal judges came to view
the issues as fully justiciable and the war as illegal. 41 The courts may
any of these matters, but I think the Court should squarely face them by granting
certiorari and setting this case for oral argument.
389 U.S. at 935 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
138. Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Velvel v. Nixon,
415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). In dismissing the case, the
district court said:
That the executive or legislative branches of the government have seen fit to carry on
a limited military action without a formal declaration of war by the legislative branch
is a matter resting solely within the discretion of those duly elected representatives of
the people. . . .This Court has neither the information necessary nor the power
required to question the wisdom of the manner in which the military activity of our
country is being conducted.
287 F. Supp. at 852.
139. In United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968), for example, a draftee
refused to comply with an induction order arguing that the government lacked authority to
conscript him to serve in an illegal war. The court held this to be a nonjusticiable political
question, but also found that there had been joint legislative-executive authorization of the
war. Id. at 514-15. In Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970), the district court
found that the constitutionality of the Vietnam War raised a nonjusticiable political question
concerning separation of powers, but also found that Congress had actively participated in the
decisions to use military force in Vietnam through enactment of the Selective Service Act, and
various military appropriations bills. Id. at 481-84. In Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), the court found the legality of the Vietnam War to be nonjusticiable, but made a
point of saying the political question doctrine applied because the issues involved foreign pol-
icy. Id. at 696, 705-07. Similarly, in Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973), the
court found that a challenge to President Nixon's authority to bomb Cambodia presented a
nonjusticiable political question which was to be resolved by the political branches of govern-
ment, and the case was dismissed for lack of a justiciable issue. Id. at 865.
140. In Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Orlando v. Laird,
404 U.S. 869 (1971), for example, the court held that whether there had been congressional
authorization of the war was a justiciable question. Id. at 305-06. Though the Berk court
found sufficient legislative action to legalize the federal government's war effort, a later court
found that the means used by Congress to authorize or ratify a presidential action itself
presented a nonjusticiable political question. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
When the Vietnam War continued after congressional repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Reso-
lution, more cases came before the courts challenging the legality of the war. In Massachusetts
v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), and DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972), suits were dismissed on the ground that despite the repeal of the
Resolution, Congress had continued to authorize and ratify the President's military actions.
Id. at 1369-70.
141. The court in Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F.2d
178 (1972), for example, held that "none of the formulations of the political-question doctrine,
have shifted their views of the justiciability of the Vietnam War for two
reasons: (1) the political process would not resolve the issue in a tolera-
bly short time; and (2) the result dictated by constitutional principles had
become politically acceptable and had gained widespread popular
support.
142
Courts are extremely reluctant to determine the legality of presiden-
tial uses of force on the merits, particularly when the courts perceive
significant public support for the President's actions. By abstaining, the
courts have eliminated constitutional review, abdicated their responsibil-
ity to define the boundaries of governmental power, and essentially con-
doned the exercise of broad war and foreign policy powers by the
Executive.1 43 Where real cases and controversies are presented to the
courts, the judiciary should be viewed as constitutionally compelled to
decide these cases on their merits."4
IV. Application to United States Policies in Central America
A. Judicial Involvement and Self-Imposed Barriers
One example of unconstitutional presidential action is the Reagan
Administration's attempt to change, by force, the form of government in
Nicaragua.14 Presidential adventurism such as United States support of
the Nicaraguan "Contra" guerrillas, having the potential for directly in-
volving United States troops,146 is the type of decision the Framers felt
was best addressed by Congress, the more deliberative and representative
branch of government. Although Congress has never made a declaration
of war against Nicaragua, it is likely that most Nicaraguans consider
their country to be at war with the United States-supported guerrillas.
Moreover, although Congress has at times agreed to provide both finan-
as stated in Baker v. Carr, barred adjudication of the issue." Id. at 550 (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969)). Similarly, in Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that the issue of presidential authority to continue
bombing Cambodia was not a political question. In a companion case, the court held that
since the bombing had not been authorized by Congress, it was illegal. Holtzman v. Schles-
inger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). On appeal, the
district court's ruling in Schlesinger was reversed and the case was remanded for dismissal on
the basis that it presented a nonjusticiable political question. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d at 1312.
142. Schwartz & McCormack, supra note 127, at 1045.
143. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
* 144. Schwartz and McCormack have argued: "If people are going to be told to obey the
law and go to Vietnam because they may be lawfully commanded to do so, then the directions
they are required to honor should be based on reasons that are plainly stated and justified on
principle." Schwartz & McCormack, supra note 127, at 1049.
145. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
146. rd.
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cial and material support to the Contras, the "Contragate" scandal"4 7
indicates executive branch involvement in hostilities towards Nicaragua
even when Congress has prohibited such activities. 4
Two cases challenging presidential actions in Central America were
dismissed on procedural grounds because they raised nonjusticiable polit-
ical questions.149 In Crockett v. Reagan,1 50 the court was not concerned
with potential judicial interference with executive discretion in the field
of foreign affairs,"' nor was it troubled by the apportionment of power
between the executive and legislative branches of government.1 52 In-
stead, the court chose to base its nonjusticiability finding on the Baker v.
Carr"5 3 criterion of "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolution." '154 The court explained:
The Court concludes that the fact finding that would be neces-
sary to determine whether U.S. forces have been introduced into
hostilities or imminent hostilities in El Salvador renders this case
in its current posture non-justiciable. The questions as to the na-
ture and extent of the United States' presence in El Salvador and
whether a report under the WPR [War Powers Resolution] is man-
dated because our forces have been subject to hostile fire or are
taking part in the war effort are appropriate for congressional, not
judicial, investigation and determination....
... Even if the plaintiffs could introduce admissible evidence
concerning the state of hostilities in various geographical areas in
El Salvador where U.S. forces are stationed and the exact nature of
U.S. participation in the conflict ... the Court no doubt would be
presented conflicting evidence on those issues by defendants. The
Court lacks the resources and expertise .. .to resolve disputed
questions of fact concerning the military situation in El
Salvador.' 55
The court's analysis is unconvincing. The judiciary's role frequently
involves determining the outcome of controversies on the basis of con-
147. "Contragate" refers to the scandal involving the Reagan Administration's secret sales
of military supplies to Iran and diversion of profits to the Nicaraguan Contras. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
148. See supra note 18.
149. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 10-
22 and accompanying text.
150. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
151. Id. at 898.
152. Id.
153. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
154. 558 F. Supp. at 898.
155. Id.
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flicting views of the facts. Moreover, courts often face controversies in-
volving facts about which they know very little, yet rarely do they
dismiss such cases on the basis of the political question doctrine. Fur-
thermore, courts are increasingly faced with complex litigation where
questions of fact take years to resolve; the fact-finding involved in sophis-
ticated antitrust, securities fraud, tort, and other claims is as difficult as
ascertaining whether United States forces have been involved in hostili-
ties in El Salvador. Similarly, although the Crockett court raised the is-
sue of the reliability of evidence, that issue is present in most litigation
presenting questions of fact and is best dealt with by applying the rules of
evidence"5 6 rather than holding the case nonjusticiable due to the diffi-
culty of fact-finding.
The plaintiffs in Crockett also claimed that because of human rights
abuses in El Salvador, aid to that country violated the Foreign Assistance
Act. 157 The court dismissed this claim on the basis of the doctrine of
equitable discretion.1 58 Despite the court's assertion to the contrary,
however, Crockett was not about disagreements among members of Con-
gress; the defendants in this case were the President and his top advisors.
The issue was whether President Reagan's certification for aid to El Sal-
vador violated those provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act which pro-
hibits aid to countries engaging in human rights violations. A decision
on the merits of this issue would not have involved the court in a contro-
versy between members of Congress; the court need only have decided
whether the executive branch had complied with federal statutes.
Another case dismissed on procedural grounds was Sanchez-Espi-
noza v. Reagan. 59 Relying on the Crockett decision, the court first noted
that "this Court lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving the dispute presented." 160 The court argued that the activi-
ties of the Central Intelligence Agency and its agents in Nicaragua are
even more difficult to know with certainty than the more overt El Salva-
dor aid at issue in Crockett. Difficulty in fact-finding, however, is a par-
ticularly poor basis for a finding of nonjusticiability.
The court's second reason for avoiding adjudication of the claim was
that it would be impossible to undertake an independent resolution of the
issues "without expressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches
156. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 28 U.S.C. app. (1982).
157. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982). The plaintiffs alleged the Foreign Assistance Act was vio-
lated by any provision of aid to a country that engaged in human rights violations. 558 F.
Supp. at 902.
158. 558 F. Supp. at 902-03. The court invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel after it
chose to view the alleged violation of the Foreign Assistance Act as a quarrel among
legislators.
159. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
160. Id. at 600.
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of the government." '161 The court noted that President Reagan and
members of Congress disagreed about the law and the facts, and if the
judiciary were to intervene, "one or both of the coordinate branches
would be justifiably offended." 162
Third, the court noted that "there is a real danger of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion." 163 Explaining that the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment already were expressing different views, and that judicial
determination of the issues might present a third view, the court said:
"such an occurrence would, undoubtedly, rattle the delicate diplomatic
balance that is required in the foreign affairs arena.""
These "prudential" concerns set out by the court are often advo-
cated by Professor Bickel, 16 ' and criticized by many other scholars in-
cluding Professor Wechsler.1 66 The Supreme Court has never expressly
relied on prudential concerns as a basis for determining that a case
should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question; in fact, the
Court has stated that the political question doctrine deals with the sepa-
ration of powers.16 1 In two recent cases, Powell v. McCormack 161 and
INS v. Chadha,169 the Supreme Court indicated that neither a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution different from that held by another
branch of the government, nor significant political ramifications of a de-
cision are sufficient reasons to apply the political question doctrine. Fur-
ther, in Baker v. Carr,7 ' the Supreme Court said: "[I]t is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance." 171 In Baker v. Carr 17' and Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,173 the Court decided on the merits cases
which involved highly political issues involving the allocation of powers
among the coordinate branches of government and matters of foreign
policy, and there is no justifiable reason for treating Sanchez-Espinoza
differently.
The Sanchez-Espinoza court implied that its true concern was the
separation of powers; it viewed the issues as proper for determination by





165. See supra note 129.
166. Wechsler, supra note 127.
167. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
168. 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969).
169. 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983).
170. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
171. Id. at 211-12.
172. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
173. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Marbury v. Madison,74 one key judicial role in the constitutional separa-
tion of powers is to delimit the authority of the executive or legislative
branches. In dismissing cases on the basis of the political question doc-
trine, the judiciary abdicates its constitutional responsibility for protect-
ing the people from excessive abuses of power by the political branches.
Absent judicial checks on the abuses of the powers exercised by the
other branches, the legislative and executive branches are free to inter-
pret the law as they see fit. In the arena of foreign affairs and foreign
military actions, the executive branch has consistently interpreted the
Constitution as giving itself far greater discretion than the Framers in-
tended. One example of executive abuse of power came to light in late
1986 with the "Contragate" scandal,' 75 and with the revelations of other
secret covert actions by the Reagan Administration.176
The court's dismissal of the claims by the Nicaraguan plaintiffs in
Sanchez-Espinoza was inappropriate in light of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.177
In Filartiga, human rights-based tort claims of foreign plaintiffs in the
United States, against a foreign official in the United States, were found
to be justiciable. The facts in Sanchez-Espinoza were very similar; the
most significant difference between the cases was that the defendants in
Filartiga were foreign officials while the defendants in Sanchez-Espinoza
were United States officials. Dismissal of these claims in Sanchez-Espi-
noza, therefore, sends a clear message to the executive branch of govern-
ment: United States officials may violate international human rights laws
with greater impunity than federal courts are willing to grant to the offi-
cials of other nations.
On appeal, the Sanchez-Espinoza court's dismissal of all claims was
affirmed on different grounds, but without disapproving the basis for dis-
missal used by the district court.178 Claims by the Nicaraguans were
dismissed on several grounds: (1) although the injunctive and declara-
tory relief sought is within the court's discretion, providing such relief
would be an abuse of discretion given the sensitive nature of foreign pol-
icy;' 79 (2) the allegations of violations of the Nicaraguans' rights under
the Constitution failed to "set forth a claim on which relief can be
174. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
175. See supra note 147.
176. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
177. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs were citizens of
Paraguay who brought an action in federal court against another Paraguayan who was a for-
mer police official in the United States. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was responsi-
ble for the death of their son by torture in violation of international law. The court of appeals
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
178. 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
179. Id. at 207-08.
Spring 1987] COVERT WARS
710 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:683
granted;" 180 and (3) any statutory violations which did exist did not pro-
vide for a private damage remedy.18 The appellate court also summarily
dismissed the claims of the congressional plaintiffs on the grounds that
some of those claims were moot and others were nonjusticiable political
questions.
1 82
The judicial response to actions charging that the Vietnam War was
illegal and unconstitutional evolved from summarily dismissing the ac-
tions on political question grounds, to concluding that courts should de-
termine on the merits of the case whether the executive branch had the
authority it was asserting.'83 Opponents to American policy in Cental
America, such as the plaintiffs in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, should
be entitled to benefit from the evolution of the standard for judicial inter-
vention and have their cases heard on the merits.
As the court of appeals demonstrated in Sanchez-Espinoza, courts
wishing to abstain from cases involving United States support for the
hostile use of force in Central America can create a variety of grounds
for doing so.18 ' Regardless of whether courts dismiss cases on political
question grounds or on other procedural grounds such as standing or
equitable estoppel, courts are unwilling to get involved in difficult deci-
sions which set boundaries on legislative and executive powers. The
courts' failure to carry out their constitutional responsibility has resulted
in implicit approval of the executive branch's interpretation of its foreign
policy powers, even though this allows the Executive essentially to estab-
lish the Nation's foreign policy, often through the use of hostile force.
This is precisely the type of executive adventurism which the Framers
sought to prohibit.
185
B. Decisions on the Merits
Once the judiciary acknowledges its constitutional responsibility to
determine controversies involving the Executive's foreign policy actions,
including the use of hostile force, then it may evaluate those actions in
light of the Constitution. In the Vietnam cases, for example, once the
substantive issues were addressed, courts often found sufficient legislative
branch authorization in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 86 congressional
willingness to fund the war effort, or military conscription legislation.
180. Id. at 208. Although the court held that the case failed to set forth a claim on which
relief could be granted, the court's reasoning reflected the prudential concerns of the political
question doctrine. See supra note 129.
181. 770 F.2d at 209-10.
182. Id. at 210.
183. See supra notes 133-142 and accompanying text.
184. 770 F.2d at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (the case should be dismissed due to lack of
ripeness).
185. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
186. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
The facts in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, however, are considerably
different from the facts facing the courts in the Vietnam cases. The Bo-
land Amendment, for example, was evidence of Congressional efforts to
limit the war effort rather than to continue it.'" 7 Moreover, although
Congress has funded aid to the Contras for limited periods of time,188 the
Reagan Administration began its program of hostile force against the
government of Nicaragua long before seeking specific funds or legislative
approval from Congress. 18 9 Such actions have presented Congress with a
fait accompli problem.
Applying constitutional law to the facts in Crockett and Sanchez-
Espinoza, a court could reasonably conclude that President Reagan's
Central America initiatives have exceeded the authority vested in the ex-
ecutive office. In supporting military actions against the government of
Nicaragua, President Reagan has waged war against that sovereign na-
tion.19 Offensive hostilities, however, are a matter of national policy
which should be determined by Congress, not the Executive.' 9 '
If the Framers knew about the Contras, they might perceive the
Contras' relationship with the United States as similar to the relationship
that existed between the privateers and the federal government during
this Nation's revolutionary period. 192 Assuming this to be the case, how-
ever, the actions of the privateers were authorized exclusively by Con-
gress through the granting of letters of marque and reprisal. 93 Raising
and supporting an army, which the Reagan Administration has done
with the Contras, is also within Congress' exclusive domain. 194 Simi-
larly, despite President Reagan's imposition of a trade embargo on Nica-
ragua, the regulation of foreign commerce is constitutionally mandated
to be within the exclusive realm of Congress. 195
The Executive has the authority to use force in self-defense of the
Nation-such as to repel invasions-without seeking congressional ap-
proval. 196 Yet, neither the government of Nicaragua nor the rebels in El
Salvador have posed any serious threat to the United States.' 97 More-
over, although the President has pledged faithfully to execute the laws of
the land, these laws include nonaggression treaties ratified by the Sen-
187. See supra note 18.
188. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, at 6, col. 3.
189. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42.
190. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 26-84 and accompanying text.
192. The Contras act as agents of the United States just as privateers acted as agents of the
government 200 years ago.
193. See supra note 27.
194. See supra notes 28 & 40.
195. See supra note 29.
196. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
197. The Reagan Administration justifies its policies on the basis of the need to halt the
growth of communism. See supra note 145.
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ate s98 and customary international law. 199 Instead, the Executive has en-
dorsed hostile aggression and the violation of basic human rights,
entirely disregarding treaties which the President has the duty to execute
faithfully.
2 °
Just as the procedural law involving cases challenging executive au-
thority to use hostile force evolved during the Vietnam War, the analysis
of the substantive law also evolved. For example, applying the Yale Pa-
pers test, Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza would likely result in judgments
for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the events involved in these cases
did not require speedy executive action.2"' Similarly, the use of hostile
force to affect the political structure of a foreign sovereign should be con-
sidered a war under the Constitution; it is the type of action which the
Framers intended to be determined by Congress when they allocated to
that branch the power to declare war." A more difficult question is
whether there has been sufficient congressional action to satisfy the Con-
stitution in these cases. However, this question can be answered in the
negative for at least some of the time periods covered by the claims in
Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza.0 3
C. Proposal
The courts should proscribe at least four constitutional limitations
on a President's ability to use force and to determine foreign policy.
First, congressional authorizations must clearly and explicitly authorize
the presidential actions in question. Second, Congress must be involved
at the earliest point in foreign policymaking to avoid delivering the legis-
lative branch with afait accompli.2° Third, allowing presidential discre-
tion in the initiation of foreign hostilities violates the basic intent of the
Framers: not only is the Nation committed to hostilities without the
benefit of legislative debate or the need to obtain majority approval, but it
also shifts the burden of invoking the political process from those who
desire war to those who desire peace. 05 Fourth, the courts should limit
the ability of the legislative branch to delegate to the President broad
discretionary authority over foreign policy and the use of force, as well as
the executive branch's independent ability to use force as a tool of foreign
policy.
198. See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 116-121.
200. The plaintiffs in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza offered to prove these claims, but the
courts dismissed the cases before such evidence could be presented. 558 F. Supp. at 902; 568
F. Supp. at 601-02.
201. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 37-49 & 105-107 and accompanying text.
The courts should also not hesitate to reflect the Nation's moral
character in interpreting the application of the law. Covert wars are fed-
eral actions fought by proxy soldiers; there is no justifiable basis for treat-
ing military actions by mercenaries acting on behalf of the United States
differently from those involving United States troops. Had the courts
been willing to hear the cases in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, judicial
limitations on executive power could be imposed before American in-
volvement escalates into another Vietnam War.
Conclusion
Had the judiciary the courage to pursue the fact-finding which it
claimed was too difficult in Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, not only
would the boundaries of executive authority be more clearly delineated,
but it is feasible that some of the Reagan Administration's illegal activi-
ties in supplying aid to the Contras would have been uncovered earlier.
The judiciary would have fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to de-
termine the law and delimit the authorities and responsibilities of the
different branches of government. Importantly, such judicial action
could have helped save the Nation from the embarrassment of scandals
such as "Contragate." In exercising excessive caution in abstaining from
deciding on the merits cases such as Crockett and Sanchez-Espinoza, the
judiciary's acquiescence has aided and abetted not only the exercise of,
but also the increasing concentration of, war powers in the executive
branch of government.
Presidents exceed their authority when they use military force be-
yond that which is appropriate for the immediate defense of the Nation.
The Framers understood the Executive's role and intended to restrict it
by giving Congress the authority to initiate hostile uses of force. Presi-
dents are also restricted by numerous treaties and international law,
which only Congress has constitutional authority to abrogate.
Arguments that some uses of force do not constitute war are irrele-
vant. The fact is that all uses of force abroad-whether to protect the
interests of United States citizens, to quell civil strife, or to change the
political structure of another country-are elements of foreign policy
which the Framers intended to be implemented subject to the debate and
compromise found only in the legislative branch of government. More-
over, the Framers understood that the long-term security and stability of
the federal government could be assured only if governmental actions
with serious consequences, such as using force against a foreign sover-
eign, reflected the will of the people as expressed through the representa-
tive branch of government.
These restrictions necessarily apply to all uses of force, whether they
be covert undeclared military actions or overt formally declared wars.
Covert actions can draw the Nation into a larger scale war and therefore
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must be subject to congressional determination of foreign policy. More
importantly, just as an employer is responsible for the actions of its
agents, the United States is ultimately responsible for the covert activities
of its agents; the use of proxies should be subject to the same constitu-
tional limitations as apply to other governmental uses of force.
Professor Velvel has made a convincing argument for maintaining
legislative control over decisions to use force against foreign sovereigns:
unless we can criticize the motivations of the Framers, who had the expe-
rience of living under the regime of a strong executive, we should respect
their experience and wisdom and we should enforce their intent.20 6 The
motivations of the Framers in their attempt to design a system with an
Executive whose powers could be restrained are as applicable today as
they were 200 years ago. The judiciary can play an important role in
helping us return to values that inspired our Founding Fathers by hold-
ing the issues discussed above to be justiciable, and by defining the limits
of presidential power.
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206. Velvel, supra note 36, at 653-55.
* An Alaskan; B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1976; M.P.A., Harvard Uni-
versity, Kennedy School of Government; Member, third year class, and M.B.A. candidate.
[Vol. 14:683
